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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic model for the timing and terms of mergers and ac-
quisitions. In contrast to other models, we show that firms agree about the timing
independently from how the merger surplus is shared. Firms agree on the timing and
discuss the sharing rule of the merger surplus according to their bargaining power
or some other exogenous factor. We also show that, under asymmetric information,
the combination of surprises regarding merger timing and merger terms, can produce
either negative or positive abnormal returns for the merging firms.
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A theory on merger timing and announcement
returns
1 Introduction
The motivations that govern merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions are well established
in the literature. Typically, when firms merge, they look for gains related to operating
efficiencies (e.g.: economies of scale), market power conditions, economies by vertical in-
tegration, technology transfers, among others. These gains are generally presented in the
form of synergies.
However, since the final outcome of a merger process is usually uncertain, companies
may have an incentive to delay the decision, waiting for a given optimal timing. Recent
literature addresses this topic, following the real options theory. For instance, Lambrecht
(2004) studies the timing of mergers motivated by economies of scale, and Thijssen (2008)
addresses the timing when both efficiency gains and diversification benefits are considered.
The optimal timing (or strategic timing) appears also in Alvarez and Stenbacka (2006),
Lambrecht and Myers (2007), Hackbarth and Morellec (2008), Bernile et al. (2012), and
in Tarsalewska (2015).
Also an important topic regarding M&A is how the merger potential gains are split
between firms. The split of potential gains is established by the exchange terms of the
merger, which can be proposed by the acquiring firm or negotiated by both firms. Some
literature discusses what drives the definition of the terms, how they can be determined
and the effects on the value of merging firms.
For instance, Lambrecht (2004) defines a two-round process where firstly the firms
agree about the timing of the merger, maximizing the overall merger gains, and then
the merger terms are defined as those that induce both firms to merge at this efficient
threshold. A similar approach appears in Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) and Hackbarth
and Morellec (2008). The terms of the merger play an important role in these papers,
since they are the unique solutions that ensure the firms agree on the efficient timing.
Accordingly, the timing of the merger and the exchange terms seem to be closely related.
However, differently from the related literature, our paper suggests that the timing
and the terms are not necessarily linked. In fact, our approach shows that the firms agree
about the timing independently from the way merger synergies are split. The merger
terms are not needed to align firms behavior with the efficient threshold, suggesting that
some other factors may explain how the surplus is shared.
In fact, the determinants of the merger terms are based on different considerations,
namely, the relative negotiating power (bargaining power) of firms, that can be influenced
by takeover defenses, termination fees, and stock ownership, among others. If managers
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are considered, also agency problems may arise.
This paper also shows that some of the mixed results regarding the announcement
effects of merger and acquisitions can be explained in the context of asymmetry of infor-
mation, as suggested by Moeller et al. (2007). In efficient markets, abnormal returns can
only be explained by new information conveyed by the announcement. The announce-
ment reveals information to the market about on the merger gains or synergies and the
merger terms. i.e. how synergies will be split between the firms (Barraclough et al. 2013).
Under asymmetry of information, the market can only form expectations about these pa-
rameter values, adjusting share prices depending on the (lack of) occurrence of a merger
announcement. This process of incorporating information into share prices, can explain
all sorts of abnormal returns, as computed in the event studies methodology. Incomplete
information has also been considered before a dynamic mergers model by Morellec and
Zhdanov (2005), who suggest it plays a role in explaining positive announcement returns
and a price run-up prior to the announcement. However, they can only explain negative
abnormal returns for target firms introducing multiple competing bidders in the model.
In our model, imperfect information is the only ingredient necessary to produce negative
and positive abnormal returns, for both firms. Furthermore, and contrary to their propo-
sition, the combined returns of firms in our model can only be explained by an earlier than
expected announcement, meaning higher than expected synergies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic model where merger tim-
ing and merger terms are derived in the context of Lambrecht and Myers (2007) model.
Section 3 generalizes the analysis for any merger payoff. Section 4 discusses the deter-
minants of mergers terms. Section 5 shows that asymmetric information can explain the
empirical mixed results on the announcement abnormal returns. Section 6 concludes.
2 The timing and terms of mergers
This section presents a dynamic model of the timing of mergers and acquisitions and
discusses how the merger terms - the merger surplus accruing to the bidder and target
firm shareholders - can be obtained.
We build on Lambrecht (2004) setting and show that the merger terms cannot be
endogenously obtained. According to Lambrecht (2004) the merger terms are unique and
are obtained endogenously, as part of the optimization process. We argue that, contrary
to what he suggests, there are multiple Nash equilibriums, and his model is a particular
case of a more general model, under the restrictive assumption of constant merger terms
across the state variable.
According to the Lambrecht (2004) model, two firms have the irreversible option to
merge into a single firm benefiting from economies of scale produced by their production
functions. The firms are price takers producing an output with a Cobb-Douglas profit
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function, with p, the output price, following a geometric Brownian motion (gBm):
dp
p
= µdt+ σdz (1)
where µ < r is the drift rate, σ > 0 is the instantaneous volatility, and dz is the standard
increment of a Wiener process. Throughout the text we assume risk neutrality and a
constant risk-free interest rate, r.
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994) the value of a firm without the option to merge,
or the stand-alone firm, is given by:
Vi(p) = αip
η (2)
where
αi =
ΩKθi
r − g(η) (3)
g(η) = r − µη − 0.5σ2η(η − 1) (4)
η =
1
1− a (5)
θ =
b
1− a (6)
Ω =
(
a
a
1−a − a 11−a
)
w−
a
1−a (7)
Equation (2) denotes the value of firm i (i ∈ {1, 2}), both the stand-alone firms and
the merged firm (i = M). Ki is the fixed input (capital), and KM = K1 + K2. The
instantaneous profit function, determined by a Cobb-Douglas profit function is:
pLaiK
b
i − wLi (8)
where L stands for the variable input, K for the fixed input, and w is the cost per unit of
variable input. This function is assumed to have decreasing returns of scale with respect
to L (a < 1). However, if both inputs are variable, which is the case when a merge takes
place combining firms fixed inputs, increasing returns of scale are assumed (a+ b > 1).
When firms merge, they combine their fixed inputs (KM = K1 + K2), incurring in
some fixed sunk costs, Xi > 0. Therefore, the payoff of merging for firm i is:
Πi(p) = Γi(p)VM (p)− Vi(p)−Xi = (Γi(p)αM − αi) pη −Xi (9)
where Γi(p) is the fraction of the merged firm owned by firm i, and Γ1(p) + Γ2(p) = 1.
Denoting the fraction of firm 1 as γ(p) = Γ1(p), the fraction of firm 2 becomes Γ2(p) =
1− γ(p).
All previous models derive the merge terms, γ(p), assuming that they are constant
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across p, i.e. γ(p) = γ¯, which implies that the terms are independent of the value of firms
prior to merge. This assumption allowed them to obtain endogenously the merger terms.
We conjecture that merger terms should depend on the relative value of firms or the
value of the state variable (p). This is more perceivable in the case of Morellec and
Zhdanov (2005) model, where the state variable is precisely the stochastic relative value
of the firms. This means that when a firm is considering to merge for a certain level p,
and compares the payoff with the so-called continuation value, she has to consider that
merging later can change the merger terms, i.e. γ could be a function of p.
Following standard procedures any perpetual contingent claim on p, Fi(p), must satisfy
the following ordinary differential equation:
0.5σ2p2F ′′i (p) + µpF
′
i (p)− rFi(p) = 0 (10)
yielding the following general solution:
Fi(p) = Aip
β1 +Bip
β2 (11)
where β1 and β2 are the solutions to the fundamental quadratic equation: 0.5σ
2β(β−1)+
µβ − r = 0.
When analyzing the option to merge, each firm must consider the optimal behavior of
the other firm, i.e. what are the terms that the other firm would require in order to agree
merging for different values of p.
Let us start by analyzing how firm 1 incorporates the optimal behavior of the firm 2.
She must know what are the merger terms that make firm 2 indifferent to merge for any
p (γ2(p)). γ2(p) is firm 1 share of the merged firm that firm 2 is willing to concede, such
that every p is an optimal merger trigger. The value of the option to merge for firm 2
(O2) must satisfy the following boundary conditions:
O2(p) = A2p
β1 = [(1− γ2(p))αM − α2] pη −X2 (12)
O′2(p) = β1A2p
β1−1 = η [(1− γ2(p))αM − α2] pη−1 − γ′2(p)αMpη (13)
Please notice that we require every p to be an optimal trigger, and so these boundary
conditions must be valid to every p, an not only for a single trigger (p∗) as in standard
models. Given that the payoff is determined by γ2(p), this function can be arranged in
order to allow every p to become a trigger for investment.
Proposition 1. The value of the option to merge for firm 2, that makes her indifferent
to merge for any p is:1
O2(p) = C2αMp
β1 (14)
1All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
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where C2 > 0 is a constant yet to be determined, and
β1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
−1
2
+
α
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
> 1 (15)
The share of the bidder that the target is willing to concede is:
γ2(p) = 1− C2αMp
β1 + α2p
η +X2
αMpη
(16)
The other firm (firm 1) must now consider γ2(p) in her decision to merge. Taking into
consideration γ2(p) (i.e. replacing Γ1(p) or γ(p) by γ2(p) in equation (9)), firm 1 receives
the following payoff on merging at p = p1:
Π12(p1) = (αM − α1 − α2) p1η − C2p1β1 − (X1 +X2) (17)
where 12 denotes the case when firm 1 incorporates firm 2 required terms.
Proposition 2. The value of the option to merge for firm 1, taking into account the
merger terms required by firm 2 is:
O12(p) =

Π12(p
a
1)
(
p
pa1
)β1
for p < pa1
Π12(p) for p
a
1 6 p < pb1
Π12(p
b
1)
(
p
pb1
)β2
for p > pb1
(18)
where
pa1 =
(
β1
β1 − η
X1 +X2
αM − α1 − α2
) 1
η
(19)
and
Π12(p) = (αM − α1 − α2) pη − C2pβ1 − (X1 +X2) (20)
and pb1 is the solution to this nonlinear equation:
(β2 − η) (αM − α1 − α2) (pb1)η − (β2 − η)C2(pb1)β1 − β2(X1 +X2) = 0 (21)
Firm 1 will be willing to merge when p crosses pa1 from below. If, for any circumstance,
the first observation of p occurs at a higher level, merging will only be optimal for p < pb1.
This second trigger is relevant if the starting value of p is above pb1, and merging becomes
optimal when p crosses pb1 from above. However it is possible to show that at this trigger
mergers are not possible, because the two firms will not agree on merger terms.
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Following similar steps for firm 1, we can obtain the value of the option to merge and
the terms that firm 1 requires in order to make she indifferent to merge for any p (γ1(p)).
Proposition 3. The value of the option to merge for firm 1, that makes her indifferent
to merge for any p is:
O1(p) = C1αMp
β1 (22)
where C1 > 0 is a constant yet to be determined.
The share that firm 1 requires is:
γ1(p) =
C1αMp
β1 + α1p
η +X1
αMpη
(23)
Incorporating γ1(p) in the decision of firm 2 (i.e. replacing Γ2(p) by 1−γ1(p) in equation
(9)), the payoff accruing to firm 2 on merging at p = p2 is:
Π21(p2) = (αM − α1 − α2) p2η − C1p2β1 − (X1 +X2) (24)
Proposition 4. The value of the option to merge for firm 2, taking into account the
merger terms by required firm 1 is:
O21(p) =

Π21(p
a
2)
(
p
pa2
)β1
for p < pa2
Π21(p) for p
a
2 6 p < pb2
Π21(p
b
2)
(
p
pb2
)β2
for p > pb2
(25)
where
pa2 =
(
β1
β1 − η
X1 +X2
αM − α1 − α2
) 1
η
(26)
and
Π21(p) = (αM − α1 − α2) pη − C1pβ1 − (X1 +X2) (27)
and pb2 is the solution to this nonlinear equation:
(β2 − η) (αM − α1 − α2) (p1b2)η − (β2 − η)C1(pb2)β1 − β2(X1 +X2) = 0 (28)
As mentioned before the second trigger is not relevant, since mergers are not possible
at pb2.
From equations (19) and (26) we find that pa1 = p
a
2(= pM ), making mergers optimal
for that level of p. The most relevant characteristic of this solution is that the timing of
mergers is independent of the constants C1 and C2, meaning that it is also independent
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of the terms of the merger (γ(p)). Both firms agree to merge at pM , but the terms of the
merger are not determined endogenously by the parameters that explain the trigger for
merging.
Interestingly enough, this solution is the central planner solution, that has the advan-
tage of ensuring the maximization of the overall merger gain. In fact, a central planner
would maximize the following payoff:
ΠC(pM ) = (αM − α1 − α2) pηM − (X1 +X2) (29)
which yields the same trigger, pM .
The timing of mergers found in our model is the same obtained by Lambrecht (2004).
3 Generic payoff
In the previous section it was shown that for Lambrecht (2004) model the merger timing
is independent of the merger terms and that these terms are not unique, and must be
explained by some exogenous factor. In this section we show that these propositions hold
for any general merger payoff.
Let us assume a generic merger surplus pi(p), and that this surplus is shared by both
firms: γ(p) to firm 1 and 1− γ(p) for firm 2. The merge payoffs for each firm are:
Π1(p) = γ(p)pi(p)−X1 (30)
Π2(p) = (1− γ(p))pi(p)−X2 (31)
Firm 2 is willing to merge for any p if the following boundary conditions are met:
A2p
β
1 = (1− γ2(p))pi(p)−X2 (32)
β1A2p
β1−1 = (1− γ2(p))pi′(p)− γ′2(p)pi(p) (33)
where γ2(p) is firm 1 share of the merger surplus that firm 2 is willing to concede. These
boundary conditions can be reduced to the following differential equation, which γ2(p)
must solve:
ppi(p)γ′2(p) + ppi
′(p)γ2(p)− β1pi(p)γ2(p)− ppi′(p) + β1pi(p)− β1X2 = 0 (34)
When firm 1 considers γ2(p) in her decision, the following boundary conditions apply:
A1p
a
1
β1 = γ2(p
a
1)pi(p
a
1)−X1 (35)
β1A1p
a
1
β1−1 = γ2(pa1)pi
′(pa1) + γ
′
2(p
a
1)pi(p
a
1) (36)
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where pa1 is the trigger value. These conditions can also be reduced to the following
differential equation:
pa1pi(p
a
1)γ
′
2(p
a
1) + ppi
′(pa1)γ2(p
a
1)− β1pi(pa1)γ2(pa1)− β1X1 = 0 (37)
Combining equations (34) and (37), and considering that, for firm 2, p is always a
trigger, we are able to find the trigger value for firm 1. The same approach, starting for
firm 1 and considering for firm 2 the optimal γ(p) for firm 1 (γ1(p)), leads to the solution
for the trigger of firm 2.
Proposition 5. Two firms considering a merger with a shared surplus of any general
payoff pi(p) will agree to merge at:
pM =
β1 (pi(pM )− (X1 +X2))
pi′(pM )
(38)
and their trigger is the central planner solution.
As in the previous section, the trigger is independent of the merger terms (γ(p)).
Proposition 5 shows that if our approach is applied to other real option models of
mergers and acquisitions, it produces the same result. For example, using Morellec and
Zhdanov (2005) setting we would find the same solution trigger. However, we show that
the merger terms are not unique as in their model.
4 Finding merger terms
In the related literature the terms of the merger are usually endogenously determined, i.e.
the terms result as part of the global solution.
Lambrecht (2004) defines a two round procedure where parties first negotiate and
agree about the timing, and then decide how to share the new company. In the first round
the author assumes that it is in the best interest of each firm to merge at the central
planner trigger. In the second round they agree on the terms that induce both to exercise
the merger option at that optimal timing. In doing so, he assumes that those terms are
constant over time and are independent of the state variables. In this model, the post-
merging shareholding is unique and is a function of the stock of capital of each firm and
the merger costs. Our model differs from this model in two important aspects. First, we
do not need to impose the restriction that the firms must ex ante agree to merge on the
central planner trigger. The central planner solution arises as the result of the equilibrium
strategies of both firms. Second, we show that there are multiple acceptable sharing rules.
The approach of Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) is different. First, firms compute their
own optimal merger timing, and then the sharing rule is found as the unique solution that
ensures both firms agree on the timing. They conclude that the timing is the same as
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the central planner solution. Although their model is different from Lambrecht’s (2004)
model, if their procedure is used for the same model setting, it is straightforward to show
that the solution is exactly the same. Differently from our model, the merger terms are
constant and independent of the state variable, which produces an unique sharing rule, in
contrast to the multiple viable sharing rules in our model.
Thijssen (2008) is closely related with our paper. He assumes that the share of the
merged firm is a function of the state variables. However, in his model the timing and
terms are obtained endogenously, being a function of each other. In our model they are
independent. His model produces a single sharing rule, while in our model there are
multiple solutions. Similarly to our paper, he assumes that the bidder makes an offer that
makes the target shareholder indifferent between accepting and rejecting the bid. However
he assumes that this only occurs when the target payoff is set to zero, which corresponds
in our setting to the case of a null bargaining power for the target. When he allows both
firms to enter in a strategic merger game with the roles endogenously determined, he
suggests that the option value completely disappears and the timing is independent of the
bargaining power. This results from the assumption that the unique indifference rule for
the other firm is to have a null payoff. This is in contrast with our results, since we show
that the option value does not vanish, making worth delaying the merger until the optimal
timing. Similarly to his model, we show that the bargaining power determines the merger
terms and does not influences the timing of mergers.
Alvarez and Stenbacka (2006) make use of an exogenous bargaining power, and show
that it determines the merger terms. However, contrary to our results, they suggest that
the merger timing is influenced by firms bargaining power.
The outcome of the merger is, as we show, determined by the bargaining power of
each firm or any other exogenous factor. The determinants of that bargaining power are
a relevant question. The observation of the merger terms is however extremely difficult,
if not impossible. In perfect markets, the shares in the merged firm, will be exactly the
relative values of the firms before merging. The value of each firm before merging includes
already the merger option value, i.e. a given expectation about the sharing rule of the
merger surplus. The occurrence of any abnormal return can only be explained as the
result of a surprise to the market, either in terms of timing or the sharing rule of the
merger surplus.
5 Explaining announcement abnormal returns
Literature on mergers and acquisitions traditionally reports empirical evidence showing
positive returns for target firms and negative (or zero) returns for the shareholders of
the acquirers (Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), and Andrade et al.
(2001)). Value-loss for the acquiring shareholder is also reported by Moeller et al. (2005)
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for large deals in the late 90’s.
Recent studies suggest mixed results. Martynova and Renneboog (2011) show evidence
of positive abnormal returns for both parties, significant for the targets, but only slightly
positive for the bidder (previously, similar results appear in Bradley et al. (1988)). Barr-
aclough et al. (2013) shows mixed signs for the returns, depending on the base price used
in the analysis. However, the results indicate that the returns of the bidding firms are
relatively small when compared with the returns of the target. In a different approach,
opposite evidence is reported by Ahern (2012), where the average gains for target firms
are only modestly larger than the gains obtained by the acquirers.
Different explanations for the realized abnormal returns have been suggested in the
literature. Some of the arguments are: the relative size of the firms (e.g. Moeller et al.
(2004)), the existence of information asymmetry (e.g. Moeller et al. (2007)), the success of
the offer (e.g. Barraclough et al. (2013)), the rivalry of the merging firms (e.g. Song and
Walkling (2000)), the form of payment (e.g. Gao (2011) and Barraclough et al. (2013)),
and the nature (public or private) of the target firm (e.g. Fuller et al. (2002)), among
others.
In the context of the model herein presented, we follow the information asymmetry
argument of Moeller et al. (2007). The abnormal returns are driven by the adjustment of
prices to the information revealed by the announcement. In line with Barraclough et al.
(2013), the announcement informs the market about both the merger gains (synergies) and
the merger terms (how the synergies will be split between the firms shareholders). Under
asymmetry of information, the market can only form expectations about this relevant
piece of information, adjusting immediately the share prices once it becomes public. This
adjustment can produce all types of abnormal returns, depending on the prior assessment,
made by the shareholders of each firm about the merger gains and the bargaining power
of their own managers.
5.1 Asymmetry of information between firms and the market
Let us assume that managers have private information about the merger synergies, not
yet released to the market. Shareholders can only form expectations on the value of the
merged firm (E(VM )) and the expected merger terms (E(γ)). We assume furthermore
that managers of both firms negotiate, and shareholders agree on the terms and timing
of the merge, excluding any revision of the terms negotiated by the managers. In this
setting, the true VM is only observable by the managers of the merging firms.
The announcement of the merger reveals the timing and terms negotiated by the
managers, and the market reacts adjusting the share prices to the information revealed by
the announcement. If the announcement information is different from market expectations,
an abnormal return occurs. Since the merger timing is independent from the terms, the
timing of the announcement reveals the value of the merger synergies (or equivalently the
10
value of VM ).
Let us study the impact of a surprise in each of the two variables, starting with the
expected value of the synergies, assuming perfect information about the merger terms,
leaving for the next section the analysis of the combined effect.
The expectations of the market on VM can predict, under or overestimate the true
value revealed by the announcement. If expectations are exceeded (VM > E(VM )), the
announcement occurs earlier than expected, producing a positive abnormal return. On
the contrary, if expectations are not met by an announcement, the market will revise the
expectations on the value (timing) of the merger until an announcement occurs. This late
announcement produces a negative abnormal return.
The announcement effects are traditionally computed using the event study methodol-
ogy, under which the return (R) during the event window around the announcement date
is measured against the expected return E(R), that is calculated using a given estimation
window prior to the event. The abnormal return (AR) is simply R− E(R).
The diffusion process of the option to merge, prior to the expected merger timing, is
given by2:
dOC
OC
= rdt+ β1σdz (39)
and therefore the expected option return is:
E(R) =
E[dOC ]
OC
= r (40)
For early announcements, the event window return is positive and greater than the
expected (option) return, producing a positive abnormal return:
AR = R− E(R) > 0 (41)
Consider now the case where p reaches E(pM ) and the announcement does not occurs.
The absence of an announcement reveals that the synergies are lower than expected by
the market participants. Without any additional information, the market will revise the
expected trigger to the next infinitesimal increment of p. The diffusion of the price will
depend on what parameter explains the late announcement. For example, in the context
of Lambrecht and Myers (2007) model it can be either the value of synergies (the alphas)
2Please note, that using Itoˆ’s lemma:
dOC =
∂OC
∂p
dp+
1
2
∂2OC
∂p2
(dp)2 =
(
µβ1OC +
1
2
σ2β1(β1 − 1)OC
)
dt+ σβ1OCdz.
From the fundamental quadratic equation
1
2
σ2β1(β1 − 1) = r − µβ1,
we obtain equation (39).
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0[η/(β-η)] (X1+X2)
E[pM] E[pM’]
p
A B
Figure 1: Value of the option to merge for late announcements with updated synergy
parameters
or the merging costs. If we assume that the market updates the expectations on synergy
related parameters, let us assume αM , the value of the option will remain at OC(E(pM )) =
η
β1−η (X1 + X2) until the announcement occurs (figure 1). A normal movement of p,
increasing and decreasing over time, will always produces a positive average return in the
estimation window.3 The window will capture days of null returns and positive returns.
This is illustrated by figure 1. If the initial market expectation is that the merger occurs
at E[pM ], share prices will remain along the line 0A, with average positive returns. If the
announcement is delayed until E[p′M ], the share prices can move along the line AB, with
null returns, or along any option value function, from 0 to the segment AB, if the prices
move down, with positive returns.
For late announcements, given that the expected return is positive and the realized
return on the event date is zero, the abnormal return is negative:
AR = R− E(R) < 0 (42)
If the surprise of the lack of an announcement leads to a revision of the merging costs
Xi, the movement of prices is illustrated by figure 2. A late announcement will move prices
3Only for unlikely case where p always increases during the estimation window, and it begins after the
first expected pM , the return during the estimation window will be zero.
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p
A
B
Figure 2: Value of the option to merge for late announcements with updated merging
costs
along AB, which means positive but lower returns than along 0A. The realized return on
the event date will be also lower than the expected return, producing a negative abnormal
return.
Furthermore it is possible that even if information asymmetry disappears, abnormal
returns can persist. Let us suppose that that all information is released to the market
after E[pM ], meaning that all market participants and firms agree that a merger should
occur, let us assume at E[p′M ]. As long as the estimation window captures any period
during which there is imperfect information the event window return return will be lower
than the expected return, producing a negative abnormal return.
As mentioned before, the announcement also reveals how the firms will split the syn-
ergies. The merging terms can differ from those expected by the market. This can also
produce positive or negative returns in the announcement event window. If the fraction
of the merged firm accruing to firm 1 announced is higher than expected (γ > E(γ)), firm
1 will have a positive AR, while the other firm will have a negative return. If γ < E(γ),
firm 1 obtains a negative AR, and firm 2 obtains a positive AR.
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5.2 Summary of announcement returns
Combining the effects of a surprise in the merger timing and the merger terms, it is
possible to show that for either firm the announcement can produce negative, null or
positive abnormal returns. Table 1 presents the summary of those effects.
Table 1: Summary of the announcement returns
Early announcement Timely announcement Late announcement
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2
Smaller γ +/− + − + − −/+
Expected γ + + 0 0 − −
Larger γ + +/− + − −/+ −
γ is the share of the merged firm accruing to firm 1.
Early announcements produce positive returns for both firms that can be offset by the
negative effect of a smaller than expected share of the merged firm. Late announcements
produce negative abnormal returns for both firms. A higher than expected fraction on
the merged firm reduces this negative effect. For timely mergers, the only effect that
can arise comes from a surprise in the merger terms. Since the roles of bidder an target
are not endogenously determined in this model, it can explain positive, null and negative
abnormal returns for each firm.
The combined abnormal return of both firms can only be explained by a surprise in the
timing, since that a surprise in the terms can only transfer the gains from one firm to the
other. Therefore, early announcements produce positive returns and late announcements
negative returns for both firms.
Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) have also proposed a real options model where incom-
plete information of the market regarding the parameters of the merger plays a role in
explaining positive announcement returns and a price run-up prior to the announcement.
However, they can only explain negative abnormal returns for target firms introducing
multiple competing bidders in the model. In our model, imperfect information is the only
ingredient necessary to produce negative and positive abnormal returns, for both firms.
Furthermore, and contrary to their proposition, positive combined returns in our model
can only be explained by an earlier than expected announcement, meaning higher than
expected synergies.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic real options model for the timing and terms of merg-
ers. Under perfect information, we show that firms always agree on the merger timing
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independently from how the surplus is shared between firms. Contrary to most of the
previous related models, the terms are shown not to be unique, and must depend on some
exogenous factor, namely the bargaining power of each firm.
Under asymmetry of information between managers and the market, the merger an-
nouncement can arrive as a surprise to the market, and produce abnormal returns. We
show that the combination of surprises in the merger timing and merger terms can produce
negative or positive abnormal returns for either firm.
Further research could also consider the effect asymmetric information between firms
and the effect of managers compensation along with takeover incentives and defences.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since the merger payoff must be positive, and given that X2 > 0,
η > 0, and γ2(p) < 1, then limp→+∞O2(p) = +∞, and limp→0O2(p) = 0. Therefore, B2
must be set to 0, and so O2(p) = A2p
β1 . Replacing in the boundary conditions, γ2(p) is
the solution to the following differential equation:
γ′2(p)pαMp
η + (β1 − η) [(1− γ2(p))αM − α2] pη − β1X2 = 0 (43)
yielding:
γ2(p) = 1− C2αMp
β1 + α2p
η +X2
αMpη
(44)
where C2 is a constant yet to be determined.
Replacing in Equation (12), the value of the option to merge for the target firm be-
comes:
O2(p) = C2αMp
β1 (45)
and, therefore, C2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given that αM −α1−α2 > 0, β1 > η > 0, γ2(p) < 1, and C2 > 0,
limp→+∞Π12(p) = −∞, and limp→0 Π12(p) = −(X1 +X2). The option value O12(p) must
be non-negative, and therefore limp→+∞O12(p) = 0, and limp→0O12(p) = 0. Therefore,
both constants A12 and B12 in the general solution (11) can not be set to 0, and O12(p) is
a concave function, producing two possible merger triggers:
O12(p) =

A12p
β1 for p < pa1
(αM − α1 − α2) pη − C2pβ1 − (X1 +X2) for pa1 6 p < pb1
B12p
β2 for p > pb1
(46)
The first trigger pa1 is obtained with the usual boundary conditions:
A12p
a
1
β1 = (αM − α1 − α2) (pa1)η + C2(pa1)β1 − (X1 +X2) (47)
β1A12(p
a
1)
β1−1 = η (αM − α1 − α2) (pa1)η−1 + β1C2(pa1)β1−1 (48)
Solving these two equations, we obtain pa1:
pa1 =
(
β1
β1 − η
X1 +X2
αM − α1 − α2
) 1
η
(49)
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The second trigger pb1 is obtained with the following boundary conditions:
B12(p
b
1)
β2 = (αM − α1 − α2) (pb1)η + C2(pb1)β1 − (X1 +X2) (50)
β2B12(p
b
1)
β2−1 = η (αM − α1 − α2) (pb1)η−1 + β1C2(pb1)β1−1 (51)
pb1 is the solution to this nonlinear equation:
(β2 − η) (αM − α1 − α2) (pb1)η − (β2 − η)C2(pb1)β1 − β2(X1 +X2) = 0 (52)
Proof of Proposition 3. Following similar steps for the firm 1, the share that she requires
in order to make she indifferent to merge for any p, γ1(p), is the solution to the following
differential equation:
γ′1(p)pαMp
η − [β1 − η) (γ1(p)αM − α2] pη + β1X1 = 0 (53)
yielding:
γ1(p) =
C1αMp
β1 + α1p
η +X1
αMpη
(54)
where C1 is a constant yet to be determined.
The value of the option to merge for firm 1 is:
O1(p) = C1αMp
β1 (55)
and, therefore, C1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Given that αM −α1−α2 > 0, β1 > η > 0, γ1(p) < 1, and C1 > 0,
limp→+∞O21(p) = −∞, and limp→0O21(p) = −(X1 +X2). The option value O21(p) must
be non-negative, and therefore limp→+∞O21(p) = 0, and limp→0O21(p) = 0. B21 can not
be set to 0, and O21(p) is a concave function, producing two possible merger triggers, and
the option to merge for the target, O21(p), is a concave function:
O21(p) =

A21p
β1 for p < pa2
(αM − α1 − α2) pη − C1pβ1 − (X1 +X2) for pa2 6 p < pb2
B21p
β2 for p > pb2
(56)
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The first trigger pa2 is obtained with the usual boundary conditions:
A21p
a
2
β1 = (αM − α1 − α2) (pa2)η − C1pa2β1 − (X1 +X2) (57)
β1A21(p
a
2)
β1−1 = η (αM − α1 − α2) (pa2)η−1 − β1C1(pa2)β1−1 (58)
Solving these two equations, we obtain pa2:
pa2 =
(
β1
β1 − η
X1 +X2
αM − α1 − α2
) 1
η
(59)
The second trigger pb2 is obtained with the following boundary conditions:
A21(p
b
2)
β1 = (αM − α1 − α2) (pb2)η − C1(pb2)β1 − (X1 +X2) (60)
β1A21(p
b
2)
β1−1 = η (αM − α1 − α2) (pb2)η−1 − β1C1(pb2)β1−1 (61)
pb2 is the solution to this nonlinear equation:
(β2 − η) (αM − α1 − α2) (pb2)η − (β2 − η)C1(pb2)β1 − β2(X1 +X2) = 0 (62)
Proof of Proposition 5. Combining equations (34) and (37) ans simplifying produces the
following trigger:
pa1 =
β1 (pi(p
a
1)− (X1 +X2))
pi′(pa1)
(63)
Following similar steps form firm 2 produces the trigger:
pa2 =
β1 (pi(p
a
2)− (X1 +X2))
pi′(pa2)
(64)
It is straightforward to show that this is the same trigger of the central planner that has
the following payoff:
ΠC(p) = Π1(p) + Π2(p) = pi(p)− (X1 +X2). (65)
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